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In February 1994, the Federal
Open Market Committee
(FOMC) began a slow process
of increasing the federal funds
rate by 300 basis points.  The
intention was to “head off an incipient increase
in inflationary pressures and to forestall the
emergence of imbalances that so often in the
past have undermined economic expansions.”1
Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth for
1994 was 4.1 percent on the fixed-weight 1987
dollar basis reported at the time, and CPI infla-
tion was under 3 percent for the third year in a
row.  The final 50 basis point increase in the
federal funds rate came on February 1, 1995.
By spring 1995, however, initial signs of an
economic slowing were beginning to appear.
For example, payroll employment was virtually
unchanged in April and fell in May; building
permits and new home sales fell below 1994
levels; and the purchasing managers’ index
(PMI) fell below 50 percent in May (a reading
below 50 percent indicates that the manufactur-
ing economy is declining).
Chairman Greenspan stated in a speech to
the Economic Club of New York in June 1995
that “incoming information on the forces
involved does suggest some increased risk of
a modest near-term recession.”  As table 1
shows, the apparent slowing of the economy
was reflected in the FOMC’s mid-year Hum-
phrey-Hawkins and Blue Chip forecasts for
1995.  The central tendency of the FOMC’s
real GDP growth forecasts had shifted down-
wards from an initial range of 2 percent to
3 percent to a lower range of 1.5 percent to
2 percent.  Similarly, the Blue Chip consensus
forecast for 1995 moved down from 2.5
percent in January to 2.2 percent in June.
The anticipated soft landing had become a
bit bumpy.
We now estimate that 1995 GDP growth
came in at 2.4 percent (1987 dollars), making it
a year of roughly average growth.  However,
the individual indicators appeared to weaken
uniformly in the spring and early summer of
1995.  Should this weakening have been ex-
pected, or was it prompted by some unexpected
event that occurred in the first half of 1995?
These questions take on an added importance
when the most recent real GDP growth rate is
under 1 percent (as the 1995:Q4 data indicate).
This article uses simple statistical forecasting
models to investigate the bumpy ride of 1995.
Our findings are that the second quarter 1995
slowdown (1) should have been partly expect-
ed, but (2) some additional bumpiness sug-
gests that a supply shock hit the economy in
the first quarter of 1995.  The vector autore-
gressions (VAR) tools employed in this case
study are readily applicable to other historical
periods, such as that leading up to the 1990
recession, as well as to a real-time evaluation
of several exogenous shocks which tend to
affect the U.S. economy.
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Competing explanations for
the 1995 slowdown
Table 1 displays real GDP
growth, the unemployment rate
and inflation for 1994, two sets of
forecasts for 1995, and the actual
data for 1995.  The GDP data are
reported according to the fixed-
weight 1987 dollar national
income and product account
(NIPA) measures, since the Hum-
phrey-Hawkins forecasts were
reported that way.  The July fore-
casts show a clear reassessment of
the outlook.  An important reason
for this was the uniform slowing
in the April and May economic
releases.  Figure 1 displays actual
data for eight economic indicators
from January1993 through Septem-
ber 1995.  Sharp declines are evi-
dent in the housing sector, with
building permits falling below 1994 levels.  A
slowdown is also apparent in the employment
indicators:  Average hours worked in manufac-
turing and the Conference Board’s help-wanted
index suffered sharp declines in the second
quarter of 1995.  In addition, two leading eco-
nomic indicators, the Conference Board’s
index of leading indicators and Stock and Wat-
son’s experimental nonfinancial leading index
(XLI2), declined during this period.  Declines
in the rate of capacity utilization and the pur-
chasing managers’ index in the second quarter
of 1995 also reflect a softening in the manufac-
turing sector.
What events caused this slowdown?  We
consider four potential explanations.  The first
hypothesis is that monetary policy was unusu-
ally restrictive during the 12 months in which
the federal funds rate rose from 3 percent to 6
percent, and the final two policy moves in
November 1994 (75 basis points) and February
1995 (50 basis points) put a significant damper
on the economy (monetary policy [MP] shocks).
Second, the 300 basis point increase was sim-
ply a normal, passive response of monetary
policy to underlying fundamentals.  In this
setting, normal response implies that the policy
actions were largely predictable on the basis of
historical data (normal response of MP).
Third, from the February 1995 forecasts to the
July 1995 forecasts, some other fundamental
Humphrey-Hawkins and Blue Chip 1995 forecasts
TABLE 1
Unemployment
GDP (87$) CPI rate1
(percent change, Q4/Q4) (percent)
1994 actual 4.1 2.6 5.6
1995 actual 2.4e 2.6 5.6
Humphrey-Hawkins
1995 forecasts
February 22, 1995 2.0-3.0 3.0-3.5 5.5
July 19, 1995 1.5-2.0 3.1-3.4 5.8-6.1
Blue Chip 1995
forecasts2
January 10, 1995 2.5 3.5 5.6




Sources: U.S. Department  of Labor; U.S. Department of Commerce;
Federal Reserve Board of Governors; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators.
changed which is unrelated to monetary policy.
For example, an adverse supply shock or mon-
ey demand shock could have intervened in the
first or second quarter of 1995 (other shocks).
Fourth, the spring data could have been uni-
formly “noisy”—just a fluke—perhaps due to a
shifting seasonal pattern which will be correct-
ed in future data revisions (noise).
Although these hypotheses are not mutu-
ally exclusive, each has testable implications.
First, the normal response hypothesis suggests
that the spring 1995 slowdown should have
been predictable using data through 1994.
Specifically, the uniform slowing of the eco-
nomic indicators by June 1995 should have
been implied at the time of the February
Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts.  A prima facie
case against this explanation is that the July
Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts were lower
than the February forecasts:  If the slowdown
was expected, why did the forecasts change?
A possible counter to this argument is that the
outlook for the first half was as expected, but
something fundamentally changed to alter the
outlook for the second half of 1995.  We can
address this question by comparing forecasts
of the economic indicators against the actual
data:  If the slowdown is uniformly forecast,
this is consistent with the normal response
hypothesis.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16
FIGURE 1






























































Sources: The National Association of Purchasing Management; the Conference Board; the Federal Reserve;
James Stock and Mark Watson nonfinancial experimental index; the U.S. Department of Labor;
and the U.S. Department of Commerce.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
Second, the monetary policy
shock hypothesis may also be con-
sistent with the predictability of the
second-quarter slowdown.  Given
the 75 basis point increase in the
federal funds rate in November
1994, it may have been possible to
forecast the spring slowdown.  One
way to distinguish between the
normal response hypothesis and the
MP shock hypothesis is to measure
the size of monetary policy shocks
in 1994 and 1995.  If the shocks are
small and infrequent, the 300 basis point in-
crease in the federal funds rate is consistent
with a normal response.  If the shocks are large
and contractionary, however, that favors the
MP shock hypothesis.
Third, if the spring slowdown was unpre-
dictable and not due to monetary policy
shocks, then other shocks may have been
responsible.  We attempt to quantify three
other shocks which macroeconomists think
affect the aggregate economy: permanent supply
shocks (like energy and technology shocks),
money demand shocks, and temporary expendi-
ture shocks (such as consumer demand or gov-
ernment shifts).  Our analysis uses a structural
VAR method which is closely related to work
by Gali (1992).  Finally, if no other shocks are
responsible, then the slowdown could conceiv-
ably have been noise.  Table 2 summarizes the
four hypotheses and testable restrictions.
Forecasting the economic
indicator slowdown
The February 1995 Humphrey-Hawkins
forecasts were prepared by the FOMC mem-
bers’ staff in mid-January.  This means that the
forecasts were initially prepared with data
through the third quarter of 1994 and some
monthly data from the fourth quarter.  In ask-
ing whether or not an economic event was
evident at the time, it is critical that only the
data which was available at that time be used.2
The forecasts presented below use the initial
data releases.
We consider separately eight indicators of
economic activity to forecast the changes in
employment, CPI inflation, and the federal
funds rate, as well as the indicator itself.  For
each indicator we estimate a seven-variable
VAR, which includes the indicator, the change
Summary of competing explanations
for spring 1995 slowdown
TABLE 2
Implication
Large MP Large other
Hypothesis Predictable shocks shocks
MP shocks Yes Yes No
Normal response of MP Yes No No
Other shocks No No Yes
Noise No No No
in payroll employment, the change in inflation,
the smooth change in sensitive materials prices,
the change in the federal funds rate, the growth
rate of nonborrowed reserves, and the growth
rate of total reserves.  The equation which
determines the indicator includes a constant
and six lagged values of all seven variables.
The other six equations do not include lagged
values of the indicator.  This block-recursive
structure guarantees that the employment,
inflation, and federal funds rate forecasts
are the same across each seven-variable
VAR system.
Of the eight indicators, six are in level
form: the purchasing managers’ index of the
National Association of Purchasing Manage-
ment (NAPM), the NAPM’s price index
(PMPRICE), the Stock and Watson nonfi-
nancial experimental leading index (XLI2),
manufacturing capacity utilization, the Confer-
ence Board help-wanted index, and manufac-
turing average weekly hours.  Two of the indi-
cators are in annualized log levels: the Confer-
ence Board index of leading indicators and the
Department of Commerce building permits.
The data are monthly and the sample
period for the estimation runs from January
1970 to November 1994.  We estimated the
system of equations using ordinary least
squares (OLS).3
We forecast the change in employment,
inflation, and the federal funds rate from
December 1994 through December 1996 on a
monthly basis, assuming no shocks to the sys-
tem over our forecast horizon.  Since our errors
are assumed to be mean zero and serially un-
correlated, this is a conditional expectation.
Each graph in figure 2 plots three objects:
(1) the initial unrevised data from JanuaryECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18
1993 through November 1994, (2) forecasts
from December 1994 though December 1996,
and (3) revised actual data from December
1994 through September 1995, which we did
not use in the estimation.  Focusing on the
forecast paths and the actual data, payroll em-
ployment was expected to slow gently from a
pace of 200,000 per month to 100,000 by the
end of 1995.  Instead, the actual
data came in quite bumpy—fall-
ing abruptly from a gain of over
300,000 in February to a loss of
62,000 in May.  Inflation had
been forecast to average above
4.1 percent in the first half of
1995, but instead was a much
milder 3.2 percent.  The statistical
forecast called for the federal
funds rate to rise until the middle
of the year before beginning a
slow decline; the actual funds rate
held steady from February until
midyear when it was lowered
slightly.  The data in figure 2
indicate a soft landing scenario
which encountered a bumpy
runway.
The forecasts of economic
indicators (figure 3) begin to shed
light on the monetary policy shock
and normal response hypotheses:
Could the slowdown have been
forecast?  Overall, the indicators
consistently predicted a slowdown
over the forecast horizon.  For
example, the PMI was projected to
fall from a level of over 59 percent
to under 50 percent by the end of
1995.  The XLI2 index was forecast
to turn negative by the second half
of 1995, indicating below-average
growth.  However, in most cases,
the decline in the actual data for
1995 was sharper than forecast; this
is the case for PMI, PMPRICE,
XLI2, capacity utilization, and
building permits.  Two exceptions
are the help-wanted index and the
index of leading indicators, for
which the forecasts were more
pessimistic than the actual data.
Some portion of the slowdown in
early 1995 should have been
anticipated according to this
analysis; this is consistent with
both the monetary policy shock
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Forecasts of employment, inflation, and
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policy shocks) and the normal response of
monetary policy to underlying economic fun-
damentals in 1994.  However, since the spring
slowdown was somewhat sharper than antici-
pated, some other shocks may also have played
a role in the mid-year forecast revisions.
FIGURE 3
Economic indicators: Actual data vs. forecasts
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Structural identification of monetary
policy and other shocks
The discussion above suggests that some
new information on economic fundamentals
became available between the February and
July Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts.  What was
this new information?  Below, we examine
four types of shocks which may play a sig-
nificant role in the evolution of the U.S.
economy—a supply shock, a money demand
shock, a monetary policy shock, and an ex-
penditure shock.
Identifying exogenous events
The U.S. economy has experienced nine
recessions since 1945.  One interpretation of
these economic ups and downs is that the econ-
omy tends toward its average growth rate, but
periodically exogenous events intervene—both
positive and negative shocks—which lead to
persistent deviations of real GDP from its
trend.  A large negative event, such as the
quadrupling of world oil prices in 1973, could
account for a recession on its own.  Alterna-
tively, a series of smaller, less visible negative
shocks could account for a downturn.  Many
events are observable, but their effects on the
economy, in terms of timing and magnitude,
are difficult to detect: for example, the 1993
Revenue Reconciliation Act which introduced
individual income tax rate brackets of 36 per-
cent and 39.6 percent; the economic transitions
due to the NAFTA and GATT free-trade agree-
ments; industrial reshaping due to legislative
restrictions or relaxations such as interstate
branch banking; and the shift toward managed
health care and its accompanying effects on
labor costs.  Other events are virtually impossi-
ble to observe contemporaneously.  For exam-
ple, technological improvements related to
computer miniaturization have been taking
place over the last 20 years or more, but it is
difficult to quantify the timing and extent of
the accompanying effects on productivity.
Since casual observers of the economy’s
ups and downs—both economists and the pub-
lic—cannot agree on the causes of any particu-
lar economic downturn, business cycle re-
searchers have turned to statistical methods to
identify exogenous events which lead to eco-
nomic fluctuations.  Structural vector autore-
gressions (SVARs) are a statistical attempt to
identify these shocks by their immediate effects,
or perhaps their implied long-run effects, on
the economy.  For example, Milton Friedman’s
proposition that inflation is everywhere and
always a monetary phenomenon may lead us to
identify monetary policy actions with shifts in
inflation (perhaps at certain forecast horizons);
this is an example of a long-run identifying
restriction.  A belief that the monetary authori-
ty always eases in the face of rising unemploy-
ment—a normal response of policy to the state
of the economy—might lead us to identify
unusual easing of monetary policy (a shock)
with a decrease in short-term interest rates
which was not accompanied by a prior increase
in the unemployment rate.  This is an example
of a contemporaneous identifying restriction.4
We consider four aggregate, quarterly data
series: the growth rate of real GDP, the change
in the federal funds rate, the change in real
money balances, and a short-term ex post real
interest rate.  Our data selection is similar to
Gali’s (1992) empirical implementation.  The
GDP data are the 1987 dollar fixed-weight data
which were available to policymakers in spring
1995.  Real money balances are measured as
M1 deflated by the consumer price index for
urban consumers.  We use M1 to capture better
the influence of financial innovations on the
economy, not based on its usefulness as an
indicator of monetary policy.  Ex post real
interest rates are measured as the fed funds rate
minus the inflation rate.
We impose a sufficient set of identifying
assumptions on the vector autoregression to
just identify four exogenous shocks that influ-
enced the postwar U.S. economy; four loose
labels for these shocks are (1) a supply shock,
(2) a money demand shock, (3) a monetary
policy shock, and (4) an expenditure shock.5
The supply shock captures exogenous
events which permanently affected the level of
real GDP.  Intuitively, the SVAR statistical
analysis investigates fluctuations in real GDP,
which did not quickly revert to its uncondition-
al growth path, and labels these events supply
shocks.  Some candidate observable events are
energy shocks, technological improvements or
regress, and regulatory restrictions or easings.
The money demand shock (MD) captures
exogenous events which permanently affected
the level of real balances; but did not perma-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































observable events are: a change in the pub-
lic’s desire to use cash or demand deposit
instruments; the effects of regulations on
depository institutions and financial interme-
diaries; and improvements in the financial
intermediation process.  The insistence that
these shocks have not affected real GDP per-
manently is not a generic economic implica-
tion.  The practical significance of this restric-
tion is to identify separately the money de-
mand and supply shocks by imposing a long-
run Wold causal ordering.
The monetary policy shock (MS) captures
exogenous shifts in short-term interest rates
which have no permanent effect on output; the
precise identifying restriction is related to the
expenditure shock identification discussed
below.  The monetary policy shock can be
interpreted in the following way.  Typically,
the Fed’s influence on short-term interest rates
can be related systematically to the state of the
economy.  Occasionally, the Fed looks at the
current state of the economy and decides to
deviate from this systematic rule in an ex ante
unpredictable way: The deviation is the mone-
tary policy shock.  Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1996) use a related set of assump-
tions to identify an analogous monetary policy
shock.  An advantage of the approach taken
here, however, is that the monetary policy
shock may be correlated with the current state
of the economy.6
The expenditure shock (IS) is intended to
capture temporary shifts in aggregate demand
expenditures.  (Gali [1992] refers to a shock
like this as an IS shock, a label that relates to
the textbook macroeconomic IS-LM models.)
This shock’s identifying restrictions are that it
has no permanent effects on real GDP or real
money balances and no contemporaneous ef-
fect on real money balances.7  Candidate exam-
ples of this shock include temporary shifts in
investment demand, government purchases or
net exports, as well as shifts in consumer confi-
dence.  Since temporary supply shifts can also
affect aggregate demand, these are also candi-
date shocks so long as their contemporaneous
effect on real balances is nil.
Estimates of the impulse response functions
The system of equations is estimated over
the period from January 1970 to November
1995.  Although the central objects of interest
in the investigation are the shocks themselves,
we must inspect the implications of the shocks
first in order to assess the plausibility of the
estimates.  Figure 4 displays the responses of
output, nominal and real interest rates, real
balances, money growth, and inflation to one-
standard-deviation shocks.8  The identifying
restrictions are evident from the impulse re-
sponses.  Notice that only the supply shock
affects the level of output at horizons longer
than 24 quarters, and only the money demand
and supply shocks affect real balances in the
long-run.  The final identifying restriction is
that the expenditure shock does not affect real
balances contemporaneously, as is evident
from figure 4.
Although the identifying restrictions here
differ from Gali’s (1992) slightly and our sam-
ple period extends to 1995 instead of 1987 as
in Gali’s paper, the estimated impulse response
functions are quite similar to his estimates.
Supply shock—A positive one-standard-
deviation supply shock stimulates output
growth before leveling off after six quarters.
Inflation falls immediately but temporarily.
This finding of a conditionally countercyclical
inflation rate accords well with the predictions
of business cycle models in which technology
and supply shocks lead to economic fluctua-
tions.  (See, for example, King and Watson
[1994].)  The rise in real balances is a plausible
response to individuals’desire to facilitate a
greater number of transactions.
Money demand shock—A negative one-
standard-deviation money demand shock stim-
ulates output growth temporarily, but the stan-
dard error bands are large enough that the
entire pattern of responses may be insignifi-
cantly different from zero.  According to the
point estimates, however, real balances fall
permanently: The long-run response of money
growth and inflation is to increase.  This leads
to a permanent increase in nominal interest
rates and a permanent decline in the quantity of
money demanded.
Monetary policy shock—A positive one-
standard-deviation money supply shock stimu-
lates output and leads to an increase in infla-
tion.  Many small-scale VAR models, similar
to ours, find that an expansionary monetary
policy shock leads to an anomalous decrease in
the price level, and Gali’s estimates also dis-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 23
play a hint of this “price puzzle” (see Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1996] for a
discussion of the price puzzle phenomenon).
However, our estimates do not display a price
puzzle, which may be due to the structural
identification.  Although the contemporaneous
fall in nominal interest rates is insignificant,
real interest rates fall significantly.
Expenditure shock—A positive one-stan-
dard-deviation expenditure shock leads to a
temporary increase in output and a rise in real
interest rates.  This response pattern seems
consistent with a shift outward in an aggre-
gate-demand relationship when aggregate
supply is roughly fixed:  Scarce resources
today suggest that future consumption is
cheaper than today’s consumption (that is,
real interest rates are currently high).9  The
fall in real balances seems to be
consistent with a fall in money
demand, as is evident from the
sharp increase in nominal inter-
est rates and falling output level
after the second quarter.
Below, we examine the re-
sults within the context of the
monetary policy shock and other
shocks hypotheses.
The monetary policy shock
hypothesis
The top panel of figure 5
displays the estimated monetary
policy shocks from the structural
VAR estimation discussed
above.  The shocks have been
normalized to have a variance of
one.  The bottom panel displays
a historical decomposition of real
GDP growth based upon the
monetary policy shocks only:
Specifically, this decomposition
records how output growth
would have evolved since 1987
if there had only been the esti-
mated monetary policy shocks.
According to figure 5, monetary
policy was unexpectedly tight at
the end of 1988 and in early
1989—the decomposition reveals
that real GDP growth was re-
duced by about 1.25 percent in
1989.  These estimated shocks
accord well with the Fed’s stated intention of
fighting inflation during that period.  The
historical decomposition of inflation (not re-
ported here) reveals that inflation was about
1.25 percent lower as a result of these shocks.
According to these estimates, a series of ex-
penditure shocks in 1987-88 would have
caused inflation to rise above 6 percent during
the mid-1988 to mid-1990 period if the mone-
tary shocks had not intervened.  After the
1990-91 recession, monetary policy was un-
expectedly easy at year-end 1991 and year-
end 1992.  This accords well with the Fed’s
100 basis point cut in the discount rate in
December 1991 and the lack of a monetary
policy tightening in the second half of 1992
when real GDP grew by 4.5 percent.  The
decomposition of output growth reveals that
FIGURE 5
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Note: All the shocks are normalized to have unit variance and
a positive shock results in a rise in output.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 24
1992 output growth was about
1.5 percent higher due to these
shocks.  Consequently, these
measures of unanticipated mone-
tary policy actions seem to cap-
ture the flavor of this period.
According to the monetary
policy shock hypothesis, the 1995
second-quarter slowdown was
due to an unanticipated policy
tightening at the end of 1994 or in
the first quarter of 1995.  There is
some validity to this hypothesis.
The 75 basis point increase in the
federal funds rate in November
1994 seems to be consistent with
a large unexpected monetary
policy shock in the fourth quarter
of 1994; indeed three of the four
quarters of 1994 point to tight
monetary policy.  Furthermore,
the impulse response functions
displayed in figure 4 indicate that
a 1.5-standard-deviation shock in
the fourth quarter of 1994 would
lead to about a 0.5 percent reduc-
tion in real GDP by the second
quarter of 1995.  So this hypothe-
sis may account for a portion of
the slowdown.10  The decomposi-
tion of output growth indicates
that monetary policy shocks re-
duced second-quarter 1995 real
GDP growth by 1 percent, but this
estimate includes the lagged ef-
fects of policy shocks earlier in
1994.  Nevertheless, the Fed’s
action in the fourth quarter of
1994 should have been taken into
account in the February 1995
Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts.
Consequently, while the statisti-
cal analysis indicates that mone-
tary policy actions may have
slowed the economy in the first
half of 1995, it can’t explain the
midyear projection of slower
economic growth in 1995.
The other shocks hypothesis
Figure 6 displays each of the four estimat-
ed shocks over the period 1987 to 1995, while
figure 7 displays the historical decompositions
FIGURE 6
of real GDP growth for the supply, money
demand, and expenditure shocks.  As men-
tioned above, between mid-1988 and mid-1989
the Fed raised the federal funds rate by about
300 basis points; according to our estimates,
Notes: All the shocks are normalized to have unit variance
and a positive shock results in a rise in output.
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this was a period of unexpectedly
tight monetary policy aimed at
fighting inflationary expenditure
shocks in 1988, which were grow-
ing 1987 real GDP phenomenally
(and above capacity rates).  Typi-
cal accounts of this period refer to
attempts to engineer a soft landing
for the economy, but by fall 1990,
the U.S. was slipping into a reces-
sion.11  According to our esti-
mates, two large negative supply
shocks hit the economy in the
second half of 1990.  The decom-
positions in figure 7 reveal that
these shocks were large enough to
induce two quarters of negative
growth by themselves.  This
seems like a plausible account
given the Iraqi invasion of Ku-
wait in August 1990 and the
accompanying military buildup
in the Persian Gulf during the
remainder of 1990.  Compound-
ing these problems were slightly
negative expenditure shocks in
1990 and two large negative mon-
ey demand shocks in the first half
of 1991.  The latter shocks corre-
spond to a period of turbulent
financial intermediation, as evi-
denced by the closure of insolvent
thrift institutions and bank capital
replenishment.  Monetary policy
during this period was extraordi-
narily neutral according to these
measures.  Consequently, this statistical analy-
sis suggests that events other than monetary
policy played a significant role in the 1990-91
recession.
Turning to the 1995 period, notice first
that the money demand and monetary policy
shocks are relatively small and neutral.  For
example, although the fourth-quarter expendi-
ture shock (a relatively high 1.5 standard devi-
ations) leads to an immediate increase in
fourth-quarter output (according to the impulse
response functions in figure 4), the effects
begin to reverse within two quarters.  Thus, the
fourth-quarter expenditure shock does imply a
slight slowing for 1995, although it should
have been known at the time of the February
Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts.  The second
FIGURE 7
Historical decomposition of real GDP growth

















































culprit is an estimated first-quarter negative
supply shock.  According to figure 4, this shock
alone, if not reversed, would have led to an
almost 0.75 percent reduction in output before
the end of the year.  For economic forecasters,
this shock represents news that became avail-
able in late April 1995.  The decomposition in
figure 7 indicates that the supply shock cumula-
tively (beyond just the first-quarter shock) re-
duced output growth by almost 2 percent, but
these effects were neutralized by mid-1995.
The latter fact couldn’t have been deduced until
late July, given the data release dates for the
second quarter.  Therefore, a first-quarter supply
shock appears to be the most likely culprit for
the slower growth forecasts by midyear 1995.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
Conclusion
Our case study of the 1995 economic
slowdown reveals that part of the widespread
deterioration in economic indicators was pre-
dictable in light of 1994 monetary policy
actions—in terms of the statistically unusual
actions that the Fed took, as well as its typical
response to the state of the economy in 1994.
This was not clearly evident ex ante from the
February 1995 Humphrey-Hawkins forecast
range of 2 percent to 3 percent growth; but it is
consistent with the lower end of this range.
Second, the midyear slowdown appears to have
been partially unpredictable.  This is evident
from the July 1995 Humphrey-Hawkins forecast
revision of 1.5 percent to 2 percent growth, and
our statistical analysis identifies that an adverse
supply shock of modest proportions hit the
economy in the first quarter of 1995.
NOTES
1Greenspan (1996).
2For an example of how important this distinction can be
in another context, see Diebold and Rudebusch (1991).
3Since six of the equations do not contain the seventh
variable (the economic indicator), estimation using the
method of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is more
efficient than OLS.  However, we found that the results
were relatively insensitive to the estimation method, so
we report below the results from the OLS estimation.
4Alternatively, a large decrease in short-term interest rates
which was not commensurate with the (small) increase in
unemployment could signal an unusual easing.
5For technical details related to analyses like this one, see
Gali (1992) or Watson (1993).
6Both approaches to measuring monetary policy shocks
require the assumption that the Fed has implemented a
single, stable reaction function for monetary policy over
the estimation period under study.  In the current study,
this is 1970 to the present.  An additional requirement is
that the four variables in the present VAR must span the
space of exogenous events affecting the U.S. economy.
7One interpretation of this latter restriction is to take the
IS-LM apparatus at face value:  A positive expenditure
shock increases output and interest rates contemporane-
ously without real money balances changing initially.
Note that if money demand is stable, then the increase in
output leads to a higher quantity of money demanded, but
the increase in interest rates has an opposing effect.  Our
identifying restriction assumes that these two effects
cancel.  A test of this restriction is the plausibility of its
implications for other variables.
8The colored lines refer to one-standard-error “bootstrap”
standard errors.  The bootstrap standard errors were
generated using 500 Monte Carlo draws.  The original
VAR estimates were taken to be the data-generating
process, Monte Carlo errors were selected by sampling
from the original VAR innovations with replacement, and
the identifying restrictions were imposed and re-estimated
for each draw.
9See Barro’s macroeconomic textbook (1987) for an
analytical framework like the one described above.
10Our discussion refers to our estimates of the shocks.
Economists can disagree over whether a 1.5-standard-
deviation shock should be labeled “statistically different
from zero.”
11For a reference to a “soft landing,” see the Transcript
of the Federal Open Market Committee meeting,
March 28,1989.
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